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1. What relationships exist between the owner/entrepreneur, SME organizational design, and 
SME longevity? 
2. What is the role that organizational design can play to affect SME survival and, in particular, 
business risk perception? 
3. What kind of policies can be taken (e.g. by SMEs and other institutions supporting them) in 
order to improve small business longevity through proper organization design investments?  
 
ABSTRACT 
SME success is often primarily linked to the personal traits of entrepreneurs and vice versa.  In 
terms of SME failure, most of the literature, research and popular press, seems focused on 
individual factors, such as those related to the owner/entrepreneur’s profile and behavior, or 
contextual factors like those associated with relationships between the firm and its own 
stakeholders, especially on the competitive and financial systems arenas.    
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That said, some scholars have emphasized the relevance of organizational design for SME 
longevity, though there seems to be little inter-relating of the two sides. This paper examines the 
relationships between owner/entrepreneur attributes and organization design and infrastructure in an 
attempt to gain a clearer understand of SME longevity and failure. It examines critical issues in 
appropriateness and comprehensiveness of organizational design, control and decision-making 
flexibility and risk perception.  It concludes that these linkages are not well understood and may 
lead to unhelpful misdiagnoses of small business failure. It consequently suggests a research agenda 
based on a structural analysis and modeling using the system dynamics approach. 
 
1. Entrepreneurial traits and SME longevity: an ‘imperfect’ binomial relationship?  
SME success is often primarily linked to the personal traits of entrepreneurs. On the other side, 
entrepreneurial success is commonly identified with SME success. In this regard, factors like the 
entrepreneur’s need of achievement (McClelland D., 1961), internal locus of control (Brockhous R., 
1982), tolerance for ambiguity, and risk taking propensity (Burns P., 2001) have been considered as 
main determinants of entrepreneurial behavior, as well as business success or failure. 
Conversely, it has been recognized that the success of owner/entrepreneurs may differ from the 
success and longevity of their enterprises (Cantner et al, 2011). In fact, a business can be successful 
but – for a variety of reasons – its owner/entrepreneur may decide to leave the firm and sell it 
(Battisti - Okamuro 2010); or, rather, an owner/entrepreneur can feel intrinsically rewarded by the 
popularity achieved through the business, but the firm cannot rely on an organization that will allow 
it to continue operations in the long run, regardless the personal and emotional involvement of the 
entrepreneur.  
Empirical evidence demonstrates that SME success and continuity are only imperfectly overlapped 
with the success of owner/entrepreneurs. This ‘imperfect’ binomial relationship between the two 
concepts tends to become more evident when the process of aging for an enterprise reveals a lack of 
consistency in the organization design.   
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Figure 1 shows how the more a firm approaches its maturity (in terms of elapsed time from startup) 
the more most of the factors affecting its success tend to decouple from those merely associated 
with the owner/entrepreneur’s personal success. 
The purpose of this paper is to outline a research agenda covering the topic of SME survival and 
longevity through the perspective of organizational design and of its effects on both entrepreneurial 
quality and business performance.  
Our thesis is that the drive, ambition, personal contacts, knowledge, and other skill set of the 
owner/entrepreneur are not sufficient to guarantee SME longevity. On the other hand, we claim that 
it is simplistic to attribute the causes of SME failure to the inadequacies in the entrepreneur and 
even to his/her illegal or corrupt behavior. The longevity of SMEs strongly depends also on the 
design and establishment of the various dimensions of their organizational infrastructure intended to 







Figure 1: Diverging patterns of SME and entrepreneur’s success factors over SME aging 
process. 
 
We also claim that this topic has not been adequately analyzed by empirical research yet. The focus 
of research agendas on SME failure seems mostly devoted to individual factors (such as those 
related to the owner/entrepreneur’s profile and behavior) or contextual factors (such as those 
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associated with relationships between the firm and its own stakeholders, especially on the 
competitive and financial systems arenas).    
Maybe one of the reasons for this apparent lack of research attention to the organizational design 
issues as a determining factor for SME longevity or demise, relates to the implicit hypothesis that a 
focus on an organizational design investment policy would not be appropriated in this context, due 
to the costs and rigidities that such investments might generate. On the other side, it is possible to 
observe that organizational infrastructure is not only made up by formal systems. Further, 
particularly in SMEs, the informal – or unwritten – components of organization design (such as 
those related to planning, performance appraisal and rewards, career, delegation/authority and 
responsibility) may play a significant role to address the entrepreneur’s efforts towards the desired 
goals or to filter and affect their possible inadequacies in the interest of company survival and 
continuity over time. 
Basing on such a perspective, the following sections of this paper will be devoted to an analysis of 
main research contributions on the role of organizational design in affecting business longevity, 
particularly in the context of small-medium and family-owned firms.   
Such analysis will provide us with the basis to outline a research agenda in order to better frame a 
causation approach underlying the recognition of main factors determining SME bankruptcies, and 
sustaining their own longevity.  
 
2. Organizational design and business longevity. 
Different scholars have emphasized the relevance of organizational design for SME longevity.  In 
particular, Adizes (1999, chapters, 13, 14, 15) remarks how an important cause of aging for 
enterprises lies in a lack of alignment between the structure of responsibilities, the structure of 
authority, and the structure of rewards (p. 307). The concept of functionality of organization 
structure is stressed as a main factor affecting organization’s entrepreneurship. Adizes also 
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underlines how the capability of an organization to solve problems depends on the strength and 
consistency of its own mechanisms impacting on three main sources of energy, i.e.: coalesced 
authority, power, and influence.  
Adizes interprets authority as the right to make a decision. In the initial stages of business life-cycle 
(which he calls “infancy” and “adolescence”), the founder retains all decision-making authority. 
When the firm grows, an authority delegation process should start in order to keep the 
organizational system and its boundaries under control.  
Power is recognized by Adizes as another important source of energy an organization should build 
up and mobilize – consistently with other sources of energy – in order to solve problems. He 
defines power as the capability to punish or reward.  
The third source of energy for an organization is referred to influence, i.e.: a person’s capability to 
cause people to act without having to invoke authority or power.  
The interplay between coalesced authority, power, and influence defines what Adizes calls 
authorance, i.e. all the energy management uses to cause behavior to occur.  
Another interesting contribution in establishing the principle of consistency between organizational 
system design and business survival in different life-cycle stages can be seen in Brown (2008). The 
author analyzes the way twelve organizational variables should change when the firm goes through 
different development stages. Analyzed variables are the following:  
1. organizational design, which includes: structural systems, human resource systems, 
information systems, reward systems, work design, political systems, and organizational 
culture (Cummings – Worley, 2005); 
2. recruiting, including the definition of roles and responsibilities, candidate profiling and 
sourcing, applicant screening, and compensation packaging guidelines; 
3. training & development, i.e. those systems devoted to the development of workforce 
performance and leadership; 
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4. performance management, i.e. the continuous process of identifying, measuring, and 
developing individual and group results; this includes: planning, coaching, appraisal, and 
improvement; 
5. compensation and incentives, i.e. pay and rewarding systems; 
6. trust; 
7. communication; 
8. alignment, i.e. identifying whether there are any competing priorities, opposing viewpoints 
or communication breakdowns, primarily referred to the executive team and the CEO’s 
mind. 
9. teamwork; 
10. organizational learning & knowledge management; 
11. innovation; 
12. change management.       
Lack of attention towards organizational design and its fit with the crucial needs that each 
evolutionary stage of the firm implies may prejudice corporate longevity.  
The concept of corporate longevity refers to the organization’s capability to continuously renew 
itself, i.e. to align its own internal actions with the conditions of external environments. Corporate 
longevity is a measure of organization’s ability to sustain its continuity (Montuori, 2000).  
It has been emphasized by Kvee (2009) that organizational renewal can take two different forms, 
i.e.: first-order renewal, and second-order renewal. The first one relates to those firms operating in 
relatively stable and benign environments, often related to market niches. The so-called dwarf 
businesses (Bianchi – Winch  2005), having an internal change adapting their own strategic 
resources to the gradual changes of the industries where they operate, provide good examples of 
physiological patterns of organizational development in this field. 
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The second one relates to sustained self-renewing firms that have sharply mutated from an original 
state to respond or to react to a changing and dynamic environment.  
In relation to the second form of organizational renewal, Kvee (2009, p. 29) has identified a set of 
key principles of self-renewing organizations, i.e.: 
 managing internal rate of change, i.e. aligning  organizational resources and capabilities 
with external opportunities and challenges, to positively affect performance; 
 optimizing self-organizing. This principle encourages the idea of delegating decision making 
to the lowest possible level of the organization to maximize capabilities of scope throughout 
the organizational levels. In such systems, order arises from the interaction agents who share 
information, take actions, and continuously adapt each other, by taking into consideration 
emerging phenomena; 
 synchronizing concurrent exploitation-exploration. Exploitation is needed to pursue short-
term order, structure, and stability. Exploration is needed to experiment with new ideas, 
paradigms, and technologies, to create discontinuities. 
 
3. Organizational design, business risk perception and company survival. 
Wertzel and Jonsson (1989) have pointed out the relevance of organization design in affecting 
business decline. The two authors defined organizational decline as a state when businesses “fail to 
anticipate, recognize, avoid, neutralize or adapt to external or internal pressures that threaten the 
organization’s long-term survival” (p. 95). Based on this definition, they sketched a model of stages 
of organizational decline. Such model is outlined through five main stages, i.e. 1) blinded, 2) 
inaction, 3) faulty action; 4) crisis; 5) dissolution.  
The first three stages imply that a distorted or lacking business risk perception may originate 
failures in anticipating or detecting pressure toward entropy could emerge. Consequently, lack, 
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delayed or unfocused corrective or proactive action could give rise to faults, which could eventually 
lead to crisis and business demise.    
Le Roux et al (2006) also emphasize the role reduced and biased risk perceptions may play in 
affecting business decline, due to a lack of organizational design consistency.  On this regard, the 
authors remark how entrepreneurs often ignore the likelihood that a substantial competition will be 
encountered. Overestimation of product demand rates, misconception of delays and lack of 
understanding feedback relationships between causes and effects linking relevant variables, are 
often sources of imperfect reasoning, wrong decision-making, and the failure of business ideas. 
Many entrepreneurs may also fail because their businesses lack the necessary strategic resources 
(e.g. capacity, knowledge, salesforce, image).  
A consequence of this phenomenon is an increased perceived self-efficacy (i.e. ability to effectively 
accomplish the intended actions and to attain the expected targets) and augmented perceived 
control, which may generate a feeling of invulnerability in the entrepreneur. Particularly when 
strategic decision-making is focused into the hands of the single owner-entrepreneur or on a 
restricted group of collaborators (often belonging to the same business-owning family), when weak 
signals of change and discontinuity or undetected strategic opportunities in the competitive, social 
or financial system depend only from ‘gut feeling’ and entrepreneurial experience, the company 
may run the risk to suffer from unexpected crises. This is particularly true when the firm’s structural 
or operational growth rise at a sustained rate, though the company still remains small, family-
owned, and with an autarchic decision making profile.      
Empirical evidence of the relevance of such principles for business survival has been provided by 
the research conducted by Miller and Friesen (1984), and by Kvee (2009). In particular, Kvee, 
based her analysis on a group of case-studies available from the SMEs literature (De Geus, 1999; 
O’Hara, 2004; Van Driel, 2004) on long-lived firms.  
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Free and Macintosh (2008) have particularly remarked the relevance of the principle of consistency 
in organizational design in relation to the issue of risk perception as a vital component 
characterizing business survival. Though their study refers to a very large firm, such as Enron, their 
reasoning can suggest useful thoughts also for smaller firms. 
In particular, Free and Macintosh remark how a common approach in analyzing Enron’s demise has 
been associated with lack of ethics and the absence of any controls. On the contrary, they remark 
that the Enron’s control regime comprised all the most important elements typically profiling an 
organization’s design, ranging from the formalization of tasks to formalized processes, from 
performance management and bonus systems to codes of ethics, and so on. The problem was related 
to their internal consistency and their aptitude as a system to feed a sustainable growth strategy and 
to prevent that radical cultural shifts caused by individual key-players’ behavior would have 
affected the business survival.  
In this regard, the authors remark how Enron’s corporate culture took “all the characteristics of a 
combative Wall Street trading organization and ultimately compromised formal controls and 
espoused values” (p. 366). From 1996, when Mr. Skilling was appointed as Enron’s CEO, a radical 
change in the business culture was generated, and even strengthened by deep changes in 
organization design. The company strategy field was shifted from exploiting physical pipeline and 
gas exploration business to expanding energy trading expertise into a range of new commodities to 
sustain intensive earnings growth. This implied an almost exclusive focus of attention on short-term 
earnings.  
Recruitment and orientation rituals, performance targets (stock options), information reporting 
procedures (“market-to-market” accounting), compensation plans, the organization structure design 
played consistent roles in deeply embedding the values underlying the new company culture which 
led to unsustainable growth and bankruptcy. In other words, Enron’s organization system’s design 
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was not able to perceive and counteract the dangers that such a cultural shift determined by the new 
CEO would have implied for the firm.  
More specifically, the so-called peer review committee – that ruled performance management – was 
a main source of fear and greed in employees and managers. It encouraged the spontaneous 
constitution of “fiefdoms” of loyal employees who gravitated towards powerful players for 
protection. Such system provided a strong mechanism for preventing the emergence of subcultures 
in the firm. Therefore, while the business culture was a main factor affecting organizational design, 
this last in turn reinforced culture again, according to a pattern that eventually led to failure. 
A very tight organization structure enabled quick decision-making and execution, but prevented any 
kind of control or debate on actions made. Also, a high fragmentation of work was a major 
organizational cause of lack of risk perception: supervisors were used to parcel out subtasks to a 
number of subordinate employees, thereby impeding each of them a through understanding of the 
purpose and scope of fulfilled activities (Cohan, 2002, p. 287).    
In reference to the Enron case, Cohan (2002) also stresses the importance of organizational design 
factors as main determinants of the company’s failure. In particular, he focuses on the concept of 
‘information blockage’. The ability of company managers to counteract flexibly adverse market and 
financial phenomena was thwarted since information was blocked from or distorted by the board. 
According to the “law of diminishing control”, the larger an organization becomes, the weaker its 
ability to control over its actions will be if the only control and strategic decisions will continue to 
be exercised from the top (Downs, 1966).     
An important part of this ‘information blockage’ is played by the low inclination of Enron’s people 
to report bad news, at different levels of the company’s hierarchy.  Even though the company was 
experiencing rising difficulties in sustaining its aggressive strategies, nobody was inclined to admit 
or report them. Communication and rewards systems discouraged such behavior and, eventually, it 
was even difficult for people to distinguish to what extent business risk was offset by concrete 
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failure. “Adverse situations are usually open-ended; that is, poor performance seldom can be 
established conclusively … and one may just want to hold on to one’s salary and perquisites for as 
long as possible… There is likely to be distortion in the flow of information if various cognitive 
biases are in operation, and hence, fewer danger signs will be reported up to the hierarchy as 
‘relevant’” (Cohan, 2002, p. 280 and 282).      
Related to risk perception and information blockage, Currall and Epstein (2003) provide another 
important contribution towards an in-depth analysis of the deep causes of Enron’s bankruptcy. They 
stress the concept of organizational trust fragility and its dynamics as main determinants for such 
failure. The two authors define trust as “the decision to rely on another party under a condition of 
risk ... Risk, therefore, creates an opportunity for trust (p. 193-194)”. The authors also distinguish 
different typical evolutionary phases of trust in an organization; such phases go through: 1) building 
trust; 2) maintaining trust; 3) destroying trust. At an early stage, trust is portrayed at zero level since 
the parties lack information about the trustworthiness of the other part. Since this information is 
gradually provided, trust-building actions are taken. Therefore, trust grows until it begins to level 
off (maintenance stage). At this stage, trust maintains relatively constant, until actions from any 
party are taken to erode it. If trust-destroying events occur and if parties are informed and aware of 
them, the level of trust falls sharply to a negative value (distrust stage).  
Applied to this model, an interesting analysis of trust dynamics in Enron is attempted by the 
authors. They demonstrate how a distortion in provided information and the consolidated positive 
business image generated an excessive trust in different stakeholders towards the firm: investor 
community, employees, customers, members of local community and government regulators, and 
auditors were all inclined not to change their own expectations of further financial performance 
improvement by the firm, in spite of the symptoms of crisis that financial markets gave.      
A synthesis of the role played by organizational design mechanisms and specifically by information 
disclosure and risk perception on trust and decision-makers’ behavior can be made by using the 
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conceptual framework provided by Simons (1994 and 2000, chapter 13). Management control 
systems play an important role in affecting the analyzed phenomena. Management control is 
defined by the author as “the formal, information-based routines and procedures used by managers 
to maintain or alter patterns in organizational activities” (p. 170). Simons describes management 
control as a system comprising four main sub-systems, i.e.: 1) beliefs; 2) boundary; 3) diagnostic 
control, and 4) interactive control systems. The first two provide the context for the other two. They 
define, respectively, the core values and the risks to be avoided. The last two sub-systems are 
respectively focused on critical performance variables monitoring (according to feedback control 
mechanisms) and on strategic uncertainties surveillance (according to feed-forward mechanisms).  
If we apply such conceptual framework to the Enron case, and we refer to the first two subsystems 
(i.e.: beliefs and boundary) we may specifically identify two groups of “levers of control” that are 
usually managed by the board and affect the other decisions in organizational design. 
If we refer to the belief system, such levers can be defined as: “cultural thickness” and “cultural 
scope”. The first one sets the time, and therefore the continuity, with which the dominant values 
have been accumulating into the corporate culture. The second one sets the scope (broad vs. 
bounded) of corporate culture, i.e. the extent of which the dominant values accepted by the 
organization are identical for all the people working in the company or, rather, several sub-cultures 
exist (though not significantly differing each other), or even there are completely different cultures 
(fig. 2-a).  
This leads to a set of linked questions: Is culture creation and change a spontaneous and 
ungoverned process, or the board and business key-actors affecting corporate beliefs? To what 
extent do such beliefs affect organizational mechanisms ruling the attribution of roles and 
responsibilities, rewards and career processes, planning and control, information, reporting, etc.? 
To what extent are they strengthened or smoothed by such organization mechanisms?       
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Figure 2-a: Span of values profiling the belief system. 
 
If we refer to the boundary system, two more levers can be identified, i.e. strategic space focus and 
strategic space definition. The two levers are complementary attributes of the same concept (fig. 2-
b). A boundary system defines the areas of business activity and the limits and rules managers must 
observe in taking decisions. Referred to this concept, a business strategic space can be bounded or 
broad, meaning that boundaries to the field of activities are narrow or wide, respectively, so that 
more or less freedom is given to managers. At the same time, for instance, a ‘broad strategic space’ 
focus might either be characterized by a clear or undefined or a blurred strategic space definition. In 
the first case, though the boundaries for managers’ activities might be broad, the rules underlying 
their actions would be well defined, in order to avoid manager abuses or inconsistencies in decision 
making.       
In the Enron case, a very broad strategic space was matched with an undefined strategic space 
definition, leading to aggressive volume-oriented commercial strategies and risky operations. All 
company actors considered such an approach as straightforward, since the corporate culture was 
very strong, though very young, in terms of accumulation time. This was another anomaly in the 
design of the governance system of the firm. Such anomaly was due to the fact that the CEO 
established rewards, careers and information reporting systems that discouraged any kind of action 
against the dominant values that had been forced into the firm by the CEO.       






Figure 2-b: Span of strategic space profiling the boundary system. 
 
If we move from the belief and boundary systems, overarching the other two subsystems of 
management control, to the role that the levers of organization design (Simons, 2000; 2005) have 
played in the Enron case, we may observe that the time to report failure, and therefore risk 
perception, were delayed by a: 
1. short-term oriented and unclear employee retention policy,  
2. blurred responsibility and bottom-up communication system,  
3. short-term reward system,  
4. unselective and unfocused information support, which was lagged, distorted and unable feed 
actions aimed to prevent failure and detect opportunities, 
5. fragmented distribution of tasks in the organization structure. 
 
The first four factors define corresponding organizational design drivers of performance, related to 
what Simons defines as span of support. Such concept refers to the help that managers are expected 
to receive from (and give to) others to achieve their goals. 
The fifth factor defines organizational design drivers related to what Simons defines as span of 
influence, i.e. the width of the net that an individual casts in collecting data, probing new 
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information, and attempting to influence the work of others. This encourages information sharing 
and interaction. 
Organization design drivers of performance affect management drivers, i.e. those performance 
drivers that often cannot be improved by only increasing the company endowment of strategic 
resources available to managers (e.g. information systems, people, databases, etc.) (Bianchi, 2012). 
The productivity of such resources is affected by what we can define as first level (or “meta”) 
strategic resources. These resources relate to the organization setting where individual resources 
deployed by managers can transfer to the business system their own potential. In the Enron case, a 
performance driver related to risk perception processes could be measured in terms of “time to 
report failure”. Such variable affects the change in an information strategic resource, such as 








Fig. 3-a: A generic model describing ‘organizational design’ drivers impacting on “time to 















Fig. 3-b: A dynamic performance management view of the impact of organizational design 
resources and drivers on management performance and (2nd level) strategic resource 
dynamics 
 
Though Enron was a conglomerate company, a number of similarities can be detected if we 
compare this business case with many sudden failures of SMEs caused by the changes in the 
behavior of single influential players, such as their owner/entrepreneurs. This often relates to 
changes on their personal goals and inclinations, for instance implying behaviors characterized by: 
-­‐ a rising interest and involvement in politics and a disengagement in the business activities, 
without any strategy for delegating strategic decision making;   -­‐ a lack of awareness of emerging gradual phenomena (e.g. related to the competitive system) 
that could threaten the company’s survival, and which could be properly perceived by 
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improving the capability of the organization system to foster communication, and reporting 
bad news or threats by the employees to the owner;  -­‐ an increasing and obsessive search for individual prestige through an aggressive and 
disordered exploitation of the company name and resources, without an advantage for the 
firm; -­‐ an orientation towards short-term or sectoral goals (e.g. production or R&D, irrespective of 
the financial implications); -­‐ an inclination to involve and appoint as company managers people from the same business-
owning family, irrespective from their abilities and inclinations to properly carry out their 
office. 
Dramatic corporate bankruptcies are usually framed through a behavioral perspective, often 
focusing ethical issues and violations of laws. Such focus is more on individual or restricted group 
behavior, rather than also on the underlying organizational causes. 
This is not only common practice when large business failure scandals are studied (e.g. Enron, 
Parmalat), but also when smaller enterprise bankruptcies are discussed.  The causes of the illegal 
behavior of entrepreneurs and other key-business decision makers tend to be linked to single factors 
such as: individual greed, lack of social responsibility, missing company rules, loose accounting 
techniques, and a large variety of variables pertaining to the sociological and psychological 
dimensions of observed phenomena. In other cases, the causes of dramatic failures are also 
associated with managerial (or ‘technical’) errors in setting up competitive or financial strategies 
(e.g. too aggressive price reductions, product portfolio proliferation, underinvestment, product 
quality decline).  
Though such factors can be relevant in showing the effects of investigated phenomena, they may 
not be able enough to fully explain them. In fact, the causation approach underlying their own 
recognition as main factors for analyzing corporate bankruptcies is not capable to foster a deep and 
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systemic understanding of the organizational reasons leading to undesired (and often unexpected) 
pathologies. 
A higher level of inference in analyzing the link of causal factors leading to the observed 
phenomena should be related to organization design, i.e. to “the system of accountability that 
defines key positions in an organization and legitimates the rights of these positions” (to set goals, 
receive information, and influence the work of others) (Simons R., 2005). 
 
4. Organizational design policies and SME longevity: on the causations between the 
entrepreneurial profile and SME performance. 
Organization design is associated with the setting of structures and mechanisms which may outline 
transparent rules in various fields, such as: authority lines, roles and responsibility areas, resource 
acquisition, resource development and allocation, information, communication, coordination, 
accountability, career and reward/incentive systems.  
Though the different variables impacting on organizational design are quite heterogeneous, and 
often ruled by a multitude of policy makers in larger firms, they primarily affect organizational 
behavior and decision-making. For instance, the different possible ways incentive and career 
systems are structured (e.g.: short vs. long term; monetary vs. non-monetary; input vs. output vs. 
outcome measure orientation), the extent to which information tends to be shared among different 
decision makers involved in a same business process, the depth and width of organizational 
hierarchy, the speed and frequency of communication systems, the criteria underlying budgeting 
and resource allocation processes and performance evaluation, are likely to encourage or to 
discourage certain patterns of behavior carried out by the business actors. So, different conduct 
profiles in an organization – e.g. transparent/collaborative or deceptive, trust or distrust, building 
slacks or sharing resources, searching for symptomatic rather than for fundamental solutions to 
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problems, using a harvesting, divesting, or investing perspective in managing resources – can be 
substantially affected by organizational design policies.  
The investments associated with such policies are likely to develop a set of first level (or meta) 
strategic resources providing the organizational context, affecting the logics according to which 
managerial decisions aimed to build up and deploy specific (second level) strategic resources will 
be carried out.  So, for instance, in order to be able to build up capacity or to retain human capital 
(second level strategic resources), an organization may need a set of information, communication, 
performance management systems, and an organization structure (meta resources) that may foster 
the acquisition and deployment of the former resources, with a view to generating an impact on 
competitive drivers and end-results. 
Since the mix of variables impacting on organization design is quite diverse, very rarely do even 
larger firms have explicit policies aimed at building up what we can call meta strategic resources, 
according to a consistent strategy.  
A missing organizational investment policy may generate problems in coordinating the behavior of 
different decision makers in a company, particularly when a firm experiences fast growth or crisis 
patterns originated by sudden external factors: 
What is the role of organizational design in affecting decision-making and behavior in SMEs? 
Is it possible to consider organizational design as a ‘first level’ bundle of strategic resources whose 
setting, mix, consistency, and relative weight of different variables constituting it, significantly 
affects the success and survival of SMEs? 
How can concretely organizational design policies contribute to SME performance and longevity? 
To what extent the formal components of organizational design should weight over the informal 
ones in SMEs? How should the informal components (e.g. rewards systems) be designed to ensure 
their evidence, transparency and reliability?    
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As remarked in the previous sections of this paper, often the analyses of SME crises are deeply 
associated with individual factors (e.g., ethical or professional attributes, or psychological traits of 
the owner-entrepreneur), or contextual/social factors (e.g., relationships between a family business 
and different groups of people belonging to the business-owning family), or even competitive 
factors. Although such non-organizational factors can be very useful to frame the net of events 
leading to crises and unsustainable growth, they may not be fully supportive to explain the deep 
causes underlying the demise of SME organizations. Such deep causes should be searched in the 
inability of the firm (as an organizational system) to overcome inconsistencies and problems arising 
from the behavior of individual decision makers, i.e. of stakeholders both operating inside and 
outside the organizational context.  
Not only in large businesses, but also in smaller firms the organizational setting should provide a 
context to transform and coordinate into a consistent ‘formula‘ the individual energies coming from 
different players and various tangible and intangible resources, with a view to add value to them. 
So, even a micro-business should not be totally identified with its owner/manager.  
On the other hand, unsustainable growth and sudden crisis phenomena affecting smaller firms are 
often caused and framed by a too bounded and oversimplifying causation approach. Therefore, it is 
not uncommon that a firm is identified with its key-players (e.g. the owner/entrepreneur), and its 
own performance is deeply affected by individual behavior and personal traits. For instance, SME 
success is often associated with the capabilities of its founder and a bounded number of decision 
makers supporting him or her. But…  
Is that a sound basis to sustain business development and lifelong existence?  
An approach that tends to overlay the performance of a firm with the traits and behavior of single 
individuals (although those who cover important roles) runs the risk of confusing the organization 
with the individual, and thereby exposing the lifelong existence of the firm to the personal events 
that may affect the life of its key-players.  
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The sustainability of business success (even for a micro-firm) can be properly assessed if one 
considers the company ability to design a consistent organization system that fosters the 
exploitation of key-players’ individual attributes, adds value on them, and neutralizes those 
individual behaviors which may challenge the future of the company itself.     
Though the size and scope of SMEs, in terms of key-decision areas and domains, might suggest that 
organizational design investment policies are not a relevant topic in such contexts, also because it 
usually implies the establishment of formal structures and mechanisms that might over-
bureaucratize a smaller firm, such policies are also relevant in SMEs.  In fact, the specific 
complexity of SMEs (Bianchi, 2002) requires organizational structures and mechanisms that allow 
them to deal with a number of factors which – if improperly focused in a governance perspective – 
may give rise to crisis. Among such specific complexity factors in smaller firms, it is possible to 
mention the entrepreneur’s aptitudes to delegate, to settle clear boundaries between the firm and the 
business-owning family, to perceive properly the business risk, to perceive business growth rates 
sustainability and the related financial, capacity and market implications, to balance appropriately 
the short with longer terms, financial with non-financial measures in performance evaluation, to 
perceive trade-offs between a subsystem (e.g. R&D) and another one (e.g. financial) in the firm, etc. 
Often, such factors deeply characterize a small business profile, so that its success or crisis can be 
strongly associated with the capability to primarily support and improve entrepreneurs’ aptitudes 
and – through them – to foster business success. 
Though it is true, in principle, that better entrepreneurs may lead to better SMEs, it is not given for 
granted that – for instance – public policies aimed at supporting SMEs success, should have to be 
necessarily focused on entrepreneurs’ development, rather than on supporting SME organizational 
design policies.  
In other words, a conundrum emerges here:  
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 is SMEs growth mostly affected by the development of entrepreneurs’ aptitudes or – rather – 
can the latter be fostered through proper organizational structures, mechanisms and 
routines (which do not have to be necessarily formal) investment policies, that may allow 
the firm to address the behavior of its key-players?  
 Can SME organizational design be considered as an indirect lever to train better 
entrepreneurs, i.e. leaders whose aptitudes can better respond to the need to ensure the firm 
a stronger autonomy, success and lifelong existence? 
Though it is not possible to find an absolute answer to the above questions, since both 
entrepreneurial and organizational design development policies can be functional for improving 
SME performance (figure 4), it is possible to remark that: a) external efforts aimed to sustain SME 
development and success should not be oriented only and (maybe even primarily) to single 
entrepreneurs, but might and should focus SMEs and their own organizational design investment 
policies as a target; b) improving the quality of organizational design is a means to improve the 
quality of entrepreneurs. In fact, designing proper organizational systems may affect entrepreneurial 
orientation and support change in personal traits, as an outcome of an organizational learning 
process. An improvement in entrepreneur’s quality profile would, in turn, contribute to further 




















Figure 4: Entrepreneurial development vs. organizational design policies: causalities in 
affecting performance. 
 
5. Managing levers of organizational design in SMEs. 
‘Levers of organization design’ implies a multitude of heterogeneous areas of intervention, having a 
major impact on the capability of a business to coordinate its own different subsystems. Managing 
organization design investment policies is not only a typical large business critical issue; it is also 
important for those SMEs facing internal and external change, not necessarily in terms of fast 
growth. Even gradual, i.e. inertial, change is likely to generate structural discontinuities in the long 
run in an organization, that often suddenly emerge in terms of lack of coordination, information, 
communication, accountability when the firm moves from a stage to another (e.g. in times of 
generational shifts in family businesses). 
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According to Simons (2000; 2005), levers of organization design, and related investments, are 
associated with four main spans, or domains: 
1. control  
2. support  
3. influence  
4. accountability. 
Span of control defines the resources (people, funds, skills, information, contacts) directly under a 
manager’s supervision. Relevant to span of control are, for instance: the vertical depth and 
horizontal width of organization structure, the extent to which decision-making processes tend to 
couple or decouple organization units.    
Span of support refers to the help that managers are expected to receive from (and give to) others to 
achieve their goals. Relevant to span of support are, for instance, the following formal or informal 
systems:  
- Rewards/incentives, i.e. their: 
o short vs. long term orientation, and related implications on people inclination to 
report bad news and to distort emerging phenomena;   
o financial vs. non-financial orientation; 
o individual vs. group-based orientation, and related implications on people’s 
inclination to collaborate with others.  
- Career/human resource retention, i.e. their: 
o short vs. long term orientation 
o transparency of criteria; 
- Education/training, i.e. the: 
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o intensiveness of related policies and relevance of such systems for business success. 
- Responsibility, i.e. the: 
o transparency of roles and positions. 
- Communication, i.e. their: 
o reliability, speed and coverage. 
- Information, i.e. the: 
o Promptness, selectivity, quantity and mix of gathered information. 
- Internal control transparency, i.e. the: 
o tightness and time span of performance evaluation metrics. 
- Culture and beliefs, i.e. the: 
o Factors affecting values and trust dynamics. 
Span of influence is the width of the net that an individual casts in collecting data, probing new 
information, and attempting to influence the work of others. This encourages information sharing 
and interaction. The concept of span of influence could be extended to a range of institutions and 
interest groups operating alongside business, specifically concerning SMEs (e.g. chambers of 
commerce, trade associations, political lobbying). 
Relevant to span of influence are, for instance, related to:  
- Integrating units (e.g. committees, task forces, second bosses, dotted lines of accountability, 
matrix design); 
- Integration vs. fragmentation of tasks in organization design; 
- Performance indicators/reporting systems (i.e., their promptness and aptitude to foster 
coordination). 
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Span of accountability defines the range of performance measures used to evaluate a manager’s 
achievements.  
Relevant to span of accountability are, for instance, related to:  
- Scope of measures on which decision makers are made accountable; 
- Weight of outcome measures on other measures.  
Though Simons has primarily outlined the conceptual framework here described through the typical 
perspective of large and professionalized businesses, we claim here that the topic it underlies is also 
relevant for smaller firms.    
Levers of organization design may indirectly affect in a significant way the performance, and hence 
the growth sustainability and long-term survival of SMEs. Understating their importance, based on 
the consideration that organization design policies are typical large business matters, provided that 
business decision makers do not formally take them, equals to ignore the effect that informal 
(together with formal) systems are likely to generate on performance. It is likewise saying that 
strategy or planning are only ‘large business’ issues, since many SMEs are not used to formally 
embody such practices in their own routines. On the contrary, it has been demonstrated that 
informal strategic planning and entrepreneurial learning are crucial for small business survival and 
growth. 
So, exploring and understanding the indirect impact that organization design policies generate on 
SME management processes, may shed some light on the causes behind the differences in 
performance between apparently similar SMEs on an operational viewpoint, and the sudden failure 
and bankruptcy of SMEs which might have previously shown an apparent good health. 
What kind of adjustments (if any) would the ‘levers of organizational design’, and related spans, 
need to be applied to smaller businesses? In particular, what kind of changes would be needed to 
this framework in order to embody specific small family business topics, e.g. for instance: 
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succession plans, the access of people from the business owning family to managerial positions, the 
lack of professional managers and the strict overlap between the three roles of entrepreneur, 
equity-owner, and manager? To what extent organization design policies may foster the gradual 
introduction of managers from outside the business owning family? What kind of fit should the 
levers of organization design portray in order to promote a cultural change in entrepreneurial 
aptitudes (e.g. those related to delegation, or to investment policies)?       
If we refer to the Italian context, both practice and academic research have only partially focused on 
this topic. However, there is a clear sign of a rising interest on it.   
For instance, the Italian legislative system has introduced important innovations, concerning two 
relevant topics on the matter here discussed.  
On the family business side, the Law n. 55/06 has disciplined the so-called “family pact”, i.e. a 
contract through which an entrepreneur transfers his or her company equity shares to one or more 
descendents.  
Another relevant recent innovation is the legislative decree n. 231/2001. This decree has introduced 
for the first time into the Italian legal system a direct liability of companies for crimes committed by 
directors, executives, their subordinates and other subjects acting on behalf of the legal entity, when 
the unlawful conduct has been carried out in the interest of, or to the benefit of the company 
concerned. Companies shall not be considered liable pursuant to decree no. 231 if the following 
conditions exist: 
1. the individual(s) who committed the crime acted in their own exclusive interest or in the 
interest of third parties not related to the company; 
2. the managing body of the company has adopted and implemented a compliance program apt 
to prevent the misconducts sanctioned by the decree no. 231  
3. an ad hoc internal body has been appointed by the management, to oversee the 
implementation and updating of the compliance program. 
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The prescribed minimum requirements for the compliance program are: 
1. the identification of the risk areas, i.e. areas of the company processes where there is a 
possibility to commit the mentioned crimes; 
2. the identification of procedures for regulating the decision-making process in risk areas, 
with respect to the crime prevention; 
3. the management of financial resources for preventing the commission of crimes provided for 
by the decree no. 231; 
4. obligations for each division of the company to inform and report to the compliance officer; 
5. disciplinary sanctions to be inflicted to trespassers of the measures and procedures provided 
for by the compliance program. 
The weight and scope of such innovations is significant, in terms of the potential contribution they 
may give to better guarantee the rights of different SME stakeholders towards a more 
“organizational–centric” (rather than only “individual–centric”) approach.  
However, the need to preserve and exploit the advantages of individual creativity and the 
entrepreneurial approach on the one side and to balance it with a more professional organization, 
even in smaller businesses, cannot be only left to a legal discipline. In fact, law may only outline the 
framework under which the professionals who will support SMEs will have to operate. Moreover, 
such framework can also be partial or redundant, in respect to the goals that the legislator tries to 
pursue. Non-business specialists often outline legal frameworks; such frameworks are usually 
abstract depictions of business realities, whose principles should be concretely pursued by business 
professionals only. 
Therefore, such innovations may disclose significant opportunities for SME experts to foster the 
longevity of smaller firms and their own better contributions to the different expectations of their 
stakeholders.     
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6. Investigating organizational design policies and SME longevity through a System Dynamics 
approach: an outline for future research.  
This paper has discussed the relationship between owner/entrepreneur characteristics and 
organizational design in SMEs. It has identified the need for great understanding and further 
research into this relationship and specifically how it impacts on risk perception and ultimately on 
company performance.  In the short term, the success of any SME might be primarily influenced by 
the novelty or other features of the company’s product and/or service offering and by the drive, 
ambition, and other skill set of the founding entrepreneur.  However, strengths in all these do not 
guarantee the long-term survival and success of the enterprise.  As has been surmised earlier, should 
the enterprise fail, it is often attributed to inadequacies in the entrepreneur and even to illegal or 
corrupt behavior.  But here we have also considered how the design and establishment of the 
various dimensions of organizational infrastructure intended to inform and support the efforts of the 
owner/entrepreneur can also impact company performance and inadequacies here could ultimately 
be the reason for crisis. 
It is contended that the relationship between the entrepreneur and the organizational infrastructure is 
not adequately understood.  This means that not only might poor company performance, even crisis, 
be wrongly ascribed to entrepreneur inadequacy, but that key factors in organizational development 
be downplayed, even overlooked completely.  This paper therefore advocates that a program of 
research in this area would be valuable in improving the longevity and long-term business 
performance by supporting the development of organizational infrastructures that optimally support 
the entrepreneur and any other senior decision-makers. 
In order to achieve this, the relationships between organizational factor and the entrepreneur need to 
be characterized and how each of them impacts on company performance, especially in the longer 
term, investigated. The structural analysis and system behavior approach in system dynamics can be 
helpful in this effort. In fact, it can support an analysis of apparently different decisions regarding 
	   30	  
levers of organization design according to a comprehensive framework that recognizes the value of 
investment, i.e., of strategic resource to various organization systems. Also, system dynamics 
supports an analysis of tradeoffs in time and decision loci associated with organization design 
policies. Finally it may allow one to link – though indirectly – the scope and intensiveness of 
organizational investment resources to their effects on the performance of fulfilled managerial 
processes, e.g. related to: 
- risk perception; 
- budget allocation; 
- education and training; 
- project launching & execution; 
- resource building; 
- workload execution; 
- commercial. 
It is suggested that case study analysis could play a central role in this.  Initial analysis would be 
used to shed light on the critical inter-relationships in order to develop causal-loop diagrams and 
stock-flow structures to aid understanding.  These could be developed into experimental models to 
further support understanding but also to test the perspective characterized above over a number of 
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